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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues from a feminist legal theory point of view that our current 
abortion law inadequately deals with women's own experiences. There is no 
recognition of the harms and values which, in this context, are unique to 
women and of which liberal legal theory takes no account. In pregnancy, 
women experience connection as either valuable intimacy or self-identity 
destroying invasion. Abortion law should protect women from this harm and 
recognise their morality as equally as significant as liberal harms and values. 
The paper deconstructs the images and assumptions implied in current law 
which prevent the recognition of women's perspectives on abortion. It argues 
that women are in the best psychological and physical position to be making 
abortion decisions and that their moral framework of empathy and 
responsibility is more appropriate than the unhelpful and often damaging 
methods of rights, abstraction and so-called objectivity. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 13,900 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Feminist legal theories are trying to inform the law with new ways of thinking 
which the law previously silenced. Feminist ideas are particularly appropriate 
for informing medical law for two reasons. First, many medical issues relate 
specifically to women. The law which describes those issues should fit with 
women's experience of them. Second, medicine is a discipline involving 
vulnerability and caring relationships. Feminist values are therefore 
particularly applicable to debate about medical law. 
A critique of existing abortion law is an example which may be particularly 
relevant for women. The law at present does not recognise women's 
experiences of pregnancy because the existing liberal legal theory base is 
inadequate for a true conception of what abortion law involves. This paper 
will involve establishing as viable a feminist account of an alternative 
framework of values and harms. The law's ability to give weight to women's 
own experience of pregnancy has been further hindered by a set of 
assumptions and images which it holds. These need to be deconstructed in 
order to make the way open for a new morality. 
Ways will be suggested how women can best be protected from the harms 
which can happen to them. Protection cannot be had in the same way liberal 
values are ensured. The current abortion decision-making framework is not 
adequate and is based upon questionable liberal assumptions. We need to 
show how women can be responsible for moral questions. Their position in the 
debate and their moral solution-creating techniques mean women are in fact 
the best decision-makers available. The unpacking of unjustified images and 
the adoption of women's experience as a source of moral values paves the way 
for such a conclusion. 
l •. ., I I - ,- ,( ~y 
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This paper will not be trying to construct a grand theory. It will try to show 
that by abandoning attempts to remain compatible with the current legal 
theory's construction of the debate, we can inform the law in ways which will 
make it more relevant and useful in its application to women's lives. This must 
be the ultimate goal rather than a search for some elusive universal truth. 
II VALUE, HARM AND THEORY 
A Claiming Women's Own Definition of Harm 
In the area of abortion law, women are trying to get protection from an injury 
which they suffer. The primary problem is that the law is based on a 
conception of being human which is not women's experience of being human, 
and which cannot recognise that pregnancy may be harmful.1 
If the law has been defined largely by men, and if its definitions, which we 
presumed to be objective and neutral, shape societal judgments as to 
whether a problem exists or whether a harm has occurred, then can the 
law comprehend and adequately redress women's experiences of harm? 
Because "[ e ]quality has come to mean a right to be treated like the white man 
when you can show you are like him"2 women have tried to describe their 
harm in terms which correspond to the harms the law does recognise. What 
protection women do have in abortion legislation is from what a liberal human 
being would experience as harm, which the law takes as its framework. 
1 L M Finley "Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of 
Legal Reasoning" (1989) 64 Notre Dame L Rev 886, 892. 
2 CA MacKinnon Feminism Unmodified: Discourse on Life and Law (Harvard University 
Press, Massachusetts, 1987), 63. 
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"[S]erious danger ... to the life, or to the physical or mental health, of the 
woman or girl"3 are harms based on annihilation, which the liberal human 
being fears. 4 Other times women have framed the debate in terms of a right 
to privacy5 or a right to choose. Both of these rights are derived from a 
general right to autonomy - which our law perceives to be of supreme value 
to people. This tactic has met with limited success in that the law has 
recognised what it is familiar with. However, making women's harm fit within 
the law's conception of harm has not been entirely satisfactory. 
First, the law's protection of women has been limited to those harms which 
could be something like those liberal human beings could experience. There is 
no protection for harms which women uniquely experience. Secondly, 
6 
because legal language is assumed to be legitimate for all, because it 
understands itself as being aperspectived, it does not even comprehend 
that there might be fit or translation problems ... [women are] not seen ... 
as ... trying to explain as best [they] could within the alien terms of the 
law, but as ... befuddled, contradictory [people) whose account could not 
be credited at all. 
Women's arguments are being undermined by the tactic of trying to fit them 
into an existing framework which will not take them properly. Feminist debate 
becomes less credible because of these "translation problems" and so devalues 
the claims behind the debate. 
3 Section 187A Crimes Act 1%1. 
4 See below text accompanying n 8. 
5 This argument is more familiar in the United States following Roe v Wade 41
0 US 113 
(1973). 
6 Above n 1, 904. 
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Third, and perhaps most important,7 
[w]hen the design of a legal wrong does not fit the wrong as it happens to 
you, ... that law can undermine your social and political as well as legal 
legitimacy in saying what happened was an injury at all - even to 
yourself. 
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Because women's experiences are not recognised as valid by the law, and 
through that by society, women have come to question their own judgments 
and to lose confidence in themselves. If the law does not value what women 
value and ignores their perspectives, then how can women continue to find 
their own perspectives valuable themselves? 
Increasinglv ; a e- ive to women being devalued by non-recognition is 
coming c1ear. 1m,teau ot distrusting themselves, women are starting to questior 
whether the law really is neutral and whole given that it ignores their 
perspectives. It is therefore important to establish a new theory base for 
abortion law - one with its origins in the state of being which women, who are 
most affected by it, experience. 
First it is necessary to unpack the basis of current legal theory in order to 
determine why the law is unable to take account of women's experiences of 
pregnancy and abortion. Liberal theory assumes that human beings are 
separate, rational, freely-contracting individuals. "Reason" is the only mode of 
decision-making and the individual is presumed to know and act in his8 own 
interests. As a result, this human being, and therefore the legal system, most 
values autonomy and perceives as harm the threat of annihilation at the hands 
7 Above n 2, 105. 
8 The use of "his" is dehberate as this view of human beings is a distinctly male one. 
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of other individuals pursuing their own goals. Recent developments in leg
al 
theory have suggested that the human being longs for the connection whic
h his 
love of autonomy precludes him from achieving naturally.
9 However, this does 
not change legal theory's important assumption:
10 
the claim that human beings are distinct individuals first and form 
relationships later. 
Because this conception of what it is to be human is the root of law, it ca
nnot 
adequately deal with women, who do not fit the mould, nor pregnancy wh
ich is 
outside liberal theory's experience. Women are fundamentally connected 
to 
others both physically and emotionally.
11 
That sense of connection in turn entails a way of learning, a path of moral 
development, an aesthetic sense, and a view of the world and of one's 
place within it which sharply contrasts with men's. 
Women are not necessarily motivated by self-interest and even form their
 own 
preferences in reference to their social relationships.
12 Autonomy as a value is 
therefore largely irrelevant for women's experience of life. A claim that 
women do not fit liberal legalism's vision of human beings is not to claim 
that 
women are lesser human beings. If women do not have those characterist
ics, 
9 This is Critical Legal Studies' contribution. 
10 A P Harris "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory" (1990
) 42 Stan L Rev 
581,603. 
11 R West "Jurisprudence and Gender" (1988) 55 Univ Chicago L Rev
 1, 15. 
12 D L Rhode "Feminist Critical Theories" (1990) 42 Stan L Rev 617, 6
29. 
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that makes them different only. It is only by the law's privileging of individual 
autonomy-type characteristics that women are devalued.13 
Why should the autonomy of a self unaffected by others be the goal of 
human life? Why not promote altruism, responsibility and interconnection 
as the primary aspirations? 
If the liberal framework cannot cope with the values of women, then it is 
fundamentally inadequate for pregnancy. The basis of law is the concept of 
separate individuals, where during a pregnancy the "individuals" are not 
separate - not even physically. The mother-foetus relationship is prior to any 
idea of them being separate individuals. Liberal values like autonomy, 
premised as they are on separation, 14 can have little place in pregnancy, nor in 
laws about abortion. 
B Pregnancy As Connection 
The law, following its liberal theoretical base conceptualises pregnancy as two 
individuals in some kind of hierarchical relationship. Liberalism cannot 
conceive of an association which exists before a decision by an individual to 
"contract" with another to further her/his own ends. It therefore cannot deal 
with a woman's association with her foetus in the abortion context because, 
according to liberal theory, a woman must have somehow chosen to be part of 
that association. Abortion is therefore seen as annihilating the other in order 
13 L M Finley "Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice" (1987) 
96 Yale LJ 914, 943. 
14 Above n 11, 6. "Our separation entails our freedom which in turn entails our right to 
establish and pursue our own concept of value, independent of the concept of value 
pursued or favoured by others." 
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to break the association. The law cannot countenance that because its role is 
to enforce individuals' bargains with each other. 
Even to speak of the pre-birth period as one of mother-child 
'interdependence' does not begin to do justice to the experiential reality of 
pregnancy as a state of being that is neither unitary nor dual, exactly; a 
state to which we can apply no number known to us.
15 
Liberal legalism's characterisation of pregnancy is as two individuals of whom 
one happens to be separate but encapsulated in the other's womb. This 
conception16 
ignores altogether the reality that pregnancy is a process of a woman's 
body, not something which simply happens inside a woman's uterus like a 
pacemaker working inside a woman's heart 
Not only is a woman's continuing creation necessary for the process of the 
foetus' development, but the closest inter-relationship changes the woman 
also. 17 
So profound are the alterations that occur in the process of pregnancy that 
a woman may find herself to be, in some senses, a 'different person' at the 
end of the pregnancy from the one she was at its start. 
15 M Ashe "Law - Language of Maternity: Discourse Holding Nature in C
ontempt" (1988) 
22 New Engl L Rev 521, 551. 
16 D Greschner "Abortion and Democracy for Women: A Critique of Tremblay v
 Daigle" 
(1990) 35 McGill LJ 633, 650. 
17 Above n 15, 550. 
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Women appear to experience the profound alteration which the connection of 
pregnancy involves in two fundamentally different ways. Some women 
experience the connection as creative and empowering, and as irrevocably 
enriching their lives. They experience pregnancy as valuable intimacy and the 
source of their women-centred values. Pregnancy, to them, is of "knowledge 
and vision, of strength ... of experiential extremities of great seriousness".18 
However this is only one experience of the connection.19 
If a pregnancy is wanted, many women may feel an ecstatic connected 
wholeness with the wonder of their growing body. The developing fetus is 
not just part of her; it is her and part of a seamless web. Whatever is 
done to or for it, is done to her, not just through her. If the pregnancy is 
unwanted, conflict with an opposed autonomous rights holder still does not 
encapsulate what many women feel. The feelings may be of terrifying ... 
invasion by and surrender of self to the pregnancy - not of a fight against 
a separate being. After terminating an unwanted pregnancy, a woman 
does not feel as though she has vanquished an enemy, but as if she has 
been given herself back. Overwhelming relief, a sense of something 
restored - but sometimes a sense of part of herself lost as well. 
It is this capacity for women to experience pregnancy as inherently harmful 
which the liberal vision of human nature cannot comprehend. 
The law cannot comprehend women's harm because it is a harm which women 
uniquely experience. It is their potential for connection which lays them open 
to the invasion which destroys their individuation. It is this harm, and not any 
18 Above n 15, 545. 
19 Above n 1, 900-901. 
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liberal, annihilation-type conception of it, which women seek to protect 
themselves from through abortion. It is:
20 
that pregnancy is a dangerous, psychically consuming, existentially 
intrusive, and physically invasive assault upon the body which in turn leads 
to a dangerous, consuming, intrusive, invasive assault on the mother's self-
identity - that best captures women's own sense of the injury and danger 
of pregnancy, whether or not it captures the law's sense of what an 
unwanted pregnancy involves, or why women should have the right to 
terminate it. 
Women describe this very real harm in similar ways:
21 
I was sick in my heart ... It was as if I had been told my body had been 
invaded with cancer. It seemed that very wrong. 
They describe the feelings after abortion as:
22 
getting my body, myself back 
or:23 
[i]t helped me learn that I am a person. 
20 Above n 11, 30. 
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21 Above n 11, 32 quoting the Amicus Brief for the National Abortion
 Rights Action League 
in the Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricums and Gynaecologists 47
6 US 747 
(1986), 28. 
22 Interview with Julie Crosland, counsellor at Parkview Abortion Clin
ic, Wellington. 
23 Above n 21, 29. 
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The effect of pregnancy is not a competition of two selves over their competing 
ends, it is not a matter of exercising autonomy and having it thwarted by 
another, instead it involves24 
selfhood changed in a way that is irrevocable, unrecoverable. 
It is part of women's nature that connection is prior to the individual and that 
therefore identity and connection are inseparable. Pregnancy as the ultimate in 
connection overwhelms the identity. The foetus invades the woman and 
physically occupies her and in doing so, takes her over and destroys her sense 
of self. When a foetus intrudes on a woman she does not lose her autonomy 
powers, she loses something on a more basic level - herself, for herself. 
These voices of women appear to give opposite and incompatible accounts of 
pregnancy - as both valuable and harmful. But this contradiction is not a 
logical one. Women have the capacity for either or both experiences of 
pregnancy - both accounts resonate with truth because women are complex 
and contradictory and have more than one reaction to phenomena.25 
The potentiality for physical connection with others that uniquely 
characteriz.es women's lives has within it the seeds of both intimacy and 
invasion, and therefore women rightly value the former while we dread 
and fear the latter. 
Laying yourself open to the connection which can bring the valuable intimacy 
necessarily entails being vulnerable to an invasion which could destroy your 
individuation. Exactly how women would feel about pregnancy without 
24 A Dworkin Intercourse (The Free Press, New York, 1987), 122. 
25 Above n 11, 53. 
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society's current attitudes and structures is unclear. The conceptio
n of the 
contradiction might change if women no longer had to fear the ext
remes of 
invasion. However, it also seems clear that there are intrinsic cons
equences for 
a woman being "defined by how she is made"
26 and27 
being made for ... penetration, entry, occupation. 
Defining the contradiction as experiential and not logical implies th
at there is 
an essential nature - connection - which is women's. Essentialis
m is a trap 
which can be very harmful in that, by defining women by how they
 are 
different from men, "men have remained the unstated standard of 
analysis".28 
Further, by defining what is the essence of women's experience, th
e voices of 
women who experiencing things differently, or whose lives are also
 defined by 
race, class and other things are silenced. 
Experiences are not just the occurrences which happen to an indiv
idual but are 
also the interpretations of them given by society which affect the w
ay the 
individual reacts or interprets them for his/herself. With experience
 in its wider 
context:29 
many women experienc.e society in ways significantly different from 
the 
ways that men experienc.e society ... c.ertain real or potential experie
nc.es 
can be described as constituting the basis for a feminist developme
nt of 
the conc.ept of 'gendered life'. These experienc.es lead many wome
n to 
develop a perspective qualitatively different from what is reflected 
in 
26 Above n 24, 123. 
27 Above n 24, 123. 
28 Above n 12, 618. 
29 M L Fineman "Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: T
he Future of Feminist Legal 
Scholarship" (1990) 42 Fla L Rev 25, 37. 
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dominant legal ideology. This is not to assert that all women think alike or 
have identical experiences. 
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While not trying to establish the definitive "woman's" experience of pregnancy, 
it is important to show that women think about pregnancy in ways different 
from the way our law perceives women think about pregnancy. The law is 
based on a legal theory orientated to men's experiences and since men do not 
experience pregnancy, the law should reflect the experiences of those who do. 
By describing the perspectives women develop the way is opened to different 
perspectives and decision-making methods which may help better resolve law in 
general, and especially the aspects which determine women's lives so 
fundamentally as abortion. Women should not be excluded by differences 
among them. 
C Creating A New Theory Base 
Women's conceptions of harm and value do not fit into liberal legal theory's 
conceptions of harm and value. Without a new theory-base, the law is 
inadequate to protect women against harm. It is important to show the 
differences be~veen feminist theory and legal theory in order to illustrate 
exactly where the law is inadequate or needs modifying. Legal theory has an 
almost opposite vision of human beings from feminist theory.30 
The human being, according to legal theory, values autonomy and fears 
annihilation, while at the same time he subjectively dreads the alienation 
that his love of autonomy entails. Women, according to feminist theory, 
value intimacy and fear separation, while at the same time longing for the 
30 Above n 11, 40. 
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individuation which our fear of separation precludes and dreading the 
invasion which our love of intimacy entails. 
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Liberal theory's domination of our law's base excludes women's experience of 
being human from informing the law. 
What then are the differences between the values and harms of these 
alternative theory-bases? The connection which the legal theory's human being 
craves31 differs from the connection which is part of women's lives. For the 
"human being" recognition by others is rewarded and empowering but it is 
because he is autonomous and separate that he desires it. He achieves 
connection by forming relationships with other individuals, where for women 
connection is prior to the self. Connection is not something done for its 
benefits; it is a part of women's nature and identity. 
Annihilation is the greatest fear of the liberal human being and it is the 
primary function of the law to protect individuals from annihilating conflict 
with each other. Invasion, whkh women greatly fear is not a threat from 
another, competing individual but of being occupied and overcome from within. 
The fear of invasion which women experience is not a fear of annihilation, nor 
can it be protected against by protecting against annihilation.
32 
I do not fear having my 'ends' frustrated [by the conflicting ends of the 
other]; I fear having my ends 'displaced' before I even formulate them. I 
fear that I will be refused the right to be an 'I' who fears. I fear that my 
ends will not be my own ... I fear I will never feel the freedom, or have 
the space, to become an ends-making creature. 
31 Above n 9. 
32 Above n 11, 42. 
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Powerlessness - in the sense of "self-naming"33 power rather than the liberal 
"power over" - and confusion are destructive of individuation. Women 
experience harm when invasion causes this powerlessness, when they are 
unable to express an identity. This happens when the connection is not 
creative but when it means the woman is possessed. This internal destruction 
of self-naming power is what women fear. 
Autonomy and individuation, though very different values, are in some sense 
interrelated. 34 
Autonomy is something which is natural to men's existential state and 
which the state might protect. Individuation, by contrast, is the material 
pre-condition to autonomy. Individuation is what you need to be before 
you can even begin to think about what you need to be free. 
Autonomy symbolises the individualism ethic at the heart of liberal legal 
theory.35 To achieve and maintain it, the individual needs a protected sphere 
in which to assert his autonomy. Isolated independence is fundamental to fully 
exercising autonomy. Only then can the individual choose for himself when 
and how to step outside the sphere to bargain with others for his ends. 
Autonomy does not gel with women's connected natures. Yet women are 
not36 
33 Above n 15, 545. 
34 Above n 11, 42. 
35 J Nedelsky "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" (1989) 1 Yale 
J of Land Feminism 7, 10. Nedelsky wants to "reclaim" autonomy from its "liberal 
incarnation" (p 7) and redefine it to retain its value for women while fitting it with their 
natures. This project appears to be confusing and it seems better to leave autonomy to its 
individualist definition and create a new term for that which women value instead -
individuation. 
36 Above n 35, 8. 
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prepared to abandon freedom as a value, nor, therefore can any of us 
completely abandon the notion of a human capacity for making one's own 
life and self. 
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The value of individuation is an ability to know one's own self without 
undervaluing the importance of connection and intimacy with others in fo
rming 
decisions and ends. Being fundamentally connected, women can never be
 the 
isolated, independent being constituted by autonomy. Yet a sense of self 
is so 
important that women profoundly fear the invasion that prevents it. An 
individuated self can still be connected to others and therefore not 
autonomous, but if possessed by others, then individuation is lost. 
To the question: 37 
can an occupied people - physically occupied inside, internally invaded -
be free; can those with a metaphysically compromised privacy have self-
determination; can those without a biologically based physical integrity 
have self-respect? 
The answer is predominantly no. Like the conditions for autonomy the la
w 
already protects, it needs also to protect some conditions for the self-resp
ect of 
individuation like: "dignity, efficacy, competence, and comprehension"
38 and 
some degree of security from oppressive power and invasion. These 
ingredients for individuation, which women value as liberal beings value 
autonomy, justify and require the law's intervention for abortion. 
37 Above n 24, 124. 
38 Above n 35, 28. 
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Describing how autonomy and individuation, annihilation and invasion relate to 
abortion is best done through the "moral analogy" of self-defence. Self-defence 
involves protecting against an ultimate form of annihilation. Similarly, foetal 
invasion is an ultimate form of invasion, an ultimate destruction of the sense of 
self. For women, invasion is morally as powerful a harm as annihilation is for 
the liberal human being. Therefore the harm a foetus causes to a woman is as 
morally significant as the harm the 'other' of self-defence causes to the liberal 
human being. 39 
Often the decision involves the conflict between her desire to protect her 
own life by not carrying a pregnancy to term and her desire to bring a life 
into the world. I contend that the abortion decision represents a decision 
to terminate a pregnancy, not to terminate a life - that the termination of 
feta! life should be considered an unfortunate consequence of a woman's 
decision to value her own life. 
So, terminating the life of the other in the self-defence scenario is considered 
an unfortunate but justifiable consequence of the decision to value his own life 
higher and protect himself from harm. 
Abortion is not analogous to self-defence. Self-defence applies to protecting 
oneself against a relatively equal, aggressing other individual. During an 
unwanted pregnancy the "other" is a vulnerable, dependent, unequal, non-
aggressor. The foetus is not even an individual 'other' but is inseparable from 
the victim. For self-defence, the protection of the self involved in abortion is 
patently unjustified. Yet self-defence is the moral equivalent to abortion 
because women can be equally vulnerable to this source of harm as the liberal 
39 R Colker "Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom" 
(1989) 77 Calif L Rev 1011, 1055. 
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being of self-defence law is to his. It is the nature of w
omen's harm which 
crucially distinguishes them. We need to show that wom
en's harm in 
pregnancy is not related to annihilation because that wo
uld undermine the 
equivalency of self-defence. Women's harm has nothin
g to do with 
annihilation; it is invasion and the threat to that can co
me from a vulnerable, 
dependent "other". It is only by recognising women's diffe
rent great harm, and 
that it can come from a source which liberals are not u
sed to harm coming 
from, that the moral need for women to be protected f
rom that fundamental 
harm can be shown. 
The effect of the equivalency of self-defence is to demo
nstrate how the threat 
of invasion justifies the law's intervention to protect wo
men through abortion. 
Self-defence even justifies protection against another wh
o is also a person. In 
abortion, the foetus is not a person and is fundamentall
y connected with the 
woman. A law which recognises the significance of wom
en's moral values and 
women's harm would need also to protect women throu
gh abortion laws, and 
would give women a role in that protection. 
Giving women such a role would be giving due recognit
ion to the strength of 
the ethic of care in women's moral structure. The pow
er would not be 
conceived as "power over" in the hierarchical sense whi
ch liberal theory 
understands relationships. Women conceptualise powe
r as "power to" create, 
think and envisage best all-round solutions. 
The moral state of liberal humans is such that in a com
petitive environment of 
equal individuals they develop an ethic of rights and au
tonomy.40 
40 Above n 1, 895. 
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To control the threat of those who would dominate you or gain at your 
expense, you must strive to gain power over them. 
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This ethic means legal theory envisages the individual will naturally aggress 
towards a vulnerable other and gain power to achieve their own ends. Women 
are in a state of inequality with many of the most important 'others' they 
encounter and this leads, feminist theory shows, to women developing a moral 
structure based on the ethic of care and responsibility. Care and nurturing is 
so strong a moral base for women that it remains dominant for them and 
"exists in spite of patriarchy's contempt for and under-valuation of these 
values".41 
The ethic of care should not be underestimated as a motivating force for 
women in relation to their pregnancies. It is one of women's highest moral 
values along with the need for a sense of self. Our present law tends to 
disregard women's moral focus and42 
treats the connection between the mother and the fetus as creating the 
potential for self-dealing on the mother's part and therefore discounts her 
view. 
The law is justifying its intention on the basis of a liberal conception of what a 
human being would do. The liberal human being might react by striking out-
against the demanding vulnerable other, rather than by empathising, so the law 
denies women control. When the "origins of aggression [are] in the failure of 
41 Above n 11, 50. 
42 Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Abortion" (1990) 103 
Harv L Rev 1325, 1339. 
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connection"43 it is clear women's moral force is being ignored. Women 
achieve connection and extend care and responsibility in reaction to it. 
The law disregards women's ethic of care value in other ways, too. By 
criminalising abortion, the law appears to be trying to make women value 
-
foetal life more. Women deeply value foetal life. Much of their moral instinct 
is directed to feeling very protective44 and women who have had abortions feel 
great sadness.45 
These women may value feta) life but also hold other values which lead 
them to choose abortion. 
A decision to abort does not reflect her lack of incentive to care for the foetus; 
instead it is her lack of control over the conditions which would allow her to 
protect it. Punishing women to make them respect foetuses is of no use. 
Women's own moral standards involve great responsibility and empathy for the 
foetus. Other circumstances and values, such as individuation, just overwhelm 
that need to care. There seems no reason therefore to fear that by introducing 
women's morality and ethics to our law we will become "a society that is 
callous toward life"46 as the law's current refusal to do implies. 
Our law appears to ignore women's entire moral framework and in an area of 
law which so involves women and is so central to their lives as abortion is, this 
43 C Gilligan Jn a Different Voice - Psychological Theory and Women 's Development (Harv
ard 
University Press, Massachusetts, 1982), 173. 
44 According to Julie Crosland, above n 22, many women she counsels are feeling so 
protective they wrap their arms around their bellies as if by doing so it could be possible 
for them to continue to nurture and care for their foetus. 
45 Above n 39, 1058. Women often mark anniversaries such as when the baby might have
 
been born, and grieve for it. 
46 Above n 39, 1058. 
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is unjustified. There is a need to incorporate into the theory-base the values 
and harms women develop through their experience of connection. The law 
needs to recognise that deciding to avoid harm through abortion may make 
women come closer to autonomy (by giving them the opportunity to attain the 
precursor, individuation) but that decision cannot be an exercise of autonomy 
itself. Instead the law must recognise women experience significant harms 
which do not come within the .sting theory's framework. The morality of 
women does provide viable alternative standards through which moral 
judgments can be made. 
D Recognition of Harm 
Unlike threats to autonomy, which our law currently recognises as harmful, 
threats to individuation must, almost by definition, be subjective. Autonomy 
involves the exercise of one's own judgement through action. Outside 
constraint on the freedom of that individual action usually can be seen 
objectively. Annihilation involves destruction or harm to the individual by the 
outside action of others. Our legal system is used to identifying this destruction 
of self from its external manifestations. 
Invasion, on the other hand, involves not harm to the self, but to the sense of 
self. The vulnerability of self-identity cannot really be judged from the outside. 
Individuation is defined as a subjective experience of forming an idea of "self'. 
Deciding when harm of this sort is happening would be a subjective decision. 
Defining women's experience of harm as subjective does not involve a 
wholesale free-for-all on harm. A mere claim that harm exists does not justify 
any or all protection from it. Although the harm itself is subjective, recognition 
of it as harm is objectively done. This is why feminists tell the stories of their 
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experience - in order to convince society that women experience a harm 
which should be respected and which they should be protected against. It is 
this arguing for a recognition that harm exists which is the first task. 
At present, New Zealand law in no way recognises the real harm pregnancy 
causes to women. Under the Crimes Act 1961, section 187A makes abortion
47 
unlawful unless, among other exceptions, there is a belief that continuing the 
pregnancy: 
would result in serious danger (not being danger normally attendant upon 
childbirth) to the life, or to the physical or mental health, of the woman or 
girl ... 
This section not only does not allow loss of self as a ground for abortion but 
expressly abandons women to this greatest form of harm by refusing to allow 
protection against the "normal" dangers of childbirth. 
The procedure for obtaining abortion is very medically, and especially 
obstetrically and gynaecologically, based.48 This medical procedure draws the 
focus far away from issues such as individuation. There is no place for 
consideration of the moral significance of pregnancy on a woman's identity. 
It is clear that our law does not recognise women's experiences of pregnancy. 
For such recognition to become possible, we must deconstruct some of the 
47 "[P]rocure the miscarriage of any woman" is the terminology used in the Crimes Act bu
t I 
will continue to use the terms "abortion" and "abortion law" as these are more familiar. 
These are also defined in the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977, s 2. 
48 See especially ss 30(4)(a) and 32 and the rest of the Contraception, Sterilisation and 
Abortion Act 1977. 
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assumptions and images which do lie behind our law and which prevent 
women's arguments from being respected. 
III DECONSTRUCTING THE LIMITING IMAGES 
A Intervention And Control 
The most basic and fundamental assumption underlying abortion law is: 49 
the fact that women's fertility (or lack of it) has traditionally been seen as 
something [in] which others have a legitimate voice, has served to suggest 
that the issue is not a question of women's rights and freedoms, but is 
rather one on which the morals or moral discourse of others have a 
legitimate bearing. 
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Why does society feel it can intervene in women's decisions about their 
pregnancies? The basis must be that it is a way in which to control women 
and dictate much of their lives. Compare abortion with the state's traditional 
reluctance to intervene in what has been seen as the private, family sphere. 
People remain unprotected from domestic violence and other dangers because 
the state sees the family as generally outside its potential for intervention. Yet, 
in the sphere of abortion, regulation is widespread. 
49 SAM McLean "Women, Rights and Reproduction" in SAM McLean (ed) Legal Issues 
in Human Reproduction (Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd, Aldershot, 1990), 213, 228. 
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The answer appears to be the relative power relationships involved. Non-
intervention in the family generally maintains and condones a patriarchal 
dominance. Women are in a position of powerlessness.
50 
In contrast, women's physical position in pregnancy allows them to control
 
this stage of the reproductive process. State intervention is necessary, 
therefore, to shift the balance of power away from women. 
A patriarchal family structure controls women's lives. Similarly, control of
 
reproduction controls not only the opportunities available to women which
 
family and pregnancy constrain, but also women's very identities. State 
prohibition of abortion ensures women cannot protect themselves from the
 
invasion which harms their individuation. Abortion regulation restricts bot
h 
women's range of opportunities in life, and their ability ever to take advan
tage 
of those opportunities. 
B Society's Institution "Motherhood'' 
The assumption that society can legitimately intervene in pregnancy de-
emphasises the woman who is pregnant and instead creates the institution 
of 
motherhood. Society's image of motherhood plays a predominant part in 
preventing it recognising women's experience of pregnancy as invasion. Th
e 
ideal of 'motherhood' and abortion to prevent harm to the mother are 
incompatible. 
First, motherhood is seen as fundamentally natural. Being so much a part
 of 
nature, the image can contain no uniquely human perspective on pregnanc
y. 
50 Above n 42, 1337. 
LAVI/ LIBRARY 
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Perceiving pregnancy as just a part of animal/natural life precludes the deep 
psychological and emotional impact women experience. With child-bearing 
deeply rooted in the biological, women must establish its emotional significance 
before they can go on to claim some of the emotional effects as harmful. 
The image of pregnancy as natural poses a hurdle to this second stage -
proving harm. Natural is associated with goodness. Pregnancy is therefore a 
good experience. Despite women's stories that they experience pregnancy as 
harm, the image of motherhood as naturally good persists. 
The idea of mystic nature isolates motherhood from the rest of a woman's 
decisions about her life. Motherhood is an institution with preconceived ideas 
as to its place in society and how women should behave when pregnant. 
Institutionalising motherhood places it in the realm of a social construct with 
the rules defined by society and not by the individual women. It is the 
institution which precludes abortion on the grounds of threat to 
individuation. 51 
To destroy the institution is not to abolish motherhood. It is to release 
the creation and sustenance of life into the same realm of decision, 
struggle, surprise, imagination, and conscious intelligence, as any other 
difficult, but freely chosen, work. 
Motherhood, the institution, is perceived as something for society, not as a 
creative life-choice for the women involved. This, in turn, leads to the 
conception of the mother as a container for the child within. The mother-as-
container image holds no place for the inter-relation and fundamental 
51 A Rich On Lies, Secrets and Silence (Norton Press, New York, 1979), 272. 
JULIA CATTANACH Page 25 
connectedness which women experience as pregnancy. This in turn means the 
effect of the relationship on the woman is minimal. A glass is not altered in its 
identity by having water in it - and similarly, women in this image of 
motherhood, cannot be fundamentally altered by having a foetus in their 
womb. If they are not fundamentally affected by pregnancy then it cannot be 
the serious harm to protect against which women claim. 
Motherhood as something for society requires that women be self-sacrificing. 
This assumption can be very damaging for a feminist argument in favour of 
abortion. To counteract it, the image of the 'mother' is broken down and 
placed in an ordinary context. In this ordinary context, a woman becomes a 
"good samaritan". The prohibition on abortion makes it compulsory for her to 
make a significant physical and intimate sacrifice which would not be required 
of anyone else. There is no duty on the passer-by to leap into a river to save a 
drowning stranger. Yet our abortion regime, by
52 
forcing women with unwanted pregnancies to bear children causes the 
women great harm and suffering, calls upon them to endure physical and 
mental torment in a way we do not ask of any Good Samaritan, and 
chains them to serve other human wishes ... 
The analogy between rescuing the drowning stranger and rescuing the foetus is 
a little flawed but it does draw attention to the assumption implicit in our law 
that women should be self-sacrificing. A pregnant women is different from the 
passing stranger in that she is, in effect, already in the water with her hands on 
the drowning person. However, this does not destroy the argument. If the 
"samaritan" in question had happened already to be swimming in the river and 
52 L N Henderson "Legality and Empathy" (1987) 85 Mich L Rev 1574, 1628. 
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had by chance come into contact with the drowning stranger, the law would 
impose no duty to rescue the stranger. It would patently be unfair to prohibit 
the "rescuer" from being helped out of the water if the rescue were seriously 
danger. Other than conceiving motherhood as uniquely involving such 
demands, there is no reason why, women in the analogous situation should be 
forced to subject themselves to genuine danger in order to complete the 
'rescue' of the foetus. 
The second difference between the drowning stranger situation and the woman 
who is pregnant may appear to justify the distinction. The relationship of the 
Good Samaritan to the person in the river is one of strangers. In the 
pregnancy situation there is a relationship sufficient for the law to impose some 
duties. Parents may have a duty not to stand and watch their children drown. 
However such duties will be limited by balancing them with the risks and 
danger involved in performing the duty. If the parent would have to make too 
great a sacrifice for the child, it would not be required of them. 
Section 187 A appears to involve just such a balancing operation. If there is a 
"serious danger ... to the life, or to the physical or mental health, of the woman 
or girl" then she may be helped out of the water - she has no "duty to 
rescue".53 Again, the legislation fails to recognise the serious danger to the 
woman's self-identification as a harm to be involved in the balancing process. 
Those serious effects are ignored in favour of a duty to continue to rescue. 
But even more fundamentally, the appearance of the usual duty-danger 
balancing is misleading. The section specifically removes the 'ordinary danger' 
of pregnancy from the balancing test. By unpacking what is involved in a 
53 B Bennett "Pregnant Women and the Duty to Rescue: A Feminist Response to the Feta! 
Rights Debate" (1991) 9 Law in Context 70, 70. 
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pregnancy, this exclusion is patently unjustified. Even dealing with only 
annihilation-type harm which the law recognises in all other situations, a 
woman's sacrifice for her child in pregnancy is much more than would be 
compulsorily required of any other person. By incorporating the accepted 
"motherhood" image into our abortion law, women as real people and not 
institutions have duties imposed on them which no one else in society would 
have imposed on them. Removing the duty from the shadow of the 
motherhood institution we can see what the duty in fact means in comparable 
situations. For example:54 
[o]ne must ask whether the argument that mothers must make their bodies 
available to their children means ... that the state will require of parent 
whose fatally ill child needs a liver transplant that he or she donate a lobe 
to keep the child alive. 
Even a normal pregnancy involves a bodily sacrifice that it would seem wrong 
to impose in any other context. When to this is added the individuation 
sacrifice which women may also be forced to make, by the prohibition of 
abortion, then the duties assumed by the labelling of women as "mothers" 
becomes clear. 
It is not merely that it is compulsory for women to take on these duties to 
others but the assumption that women who are pregnant must subordinate 
themselves to others' interests. The fact that motherhood is not conceived as a 
choice of women, for themselves, to create and bring a life into the world but 
that women who become pregnant are performing this role for others leads in 
turn to the imposition of the duty to continue to be pregnant for others. If the 
54 AL Allen "Tribe's Judicious Feminism" (1991) 44 Stan L Rev 179, 197. 
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benefit is for others, then they can require that they get that benefit. If 
creating life is a decision for women then they could control when they choose 
to assume the duties. Instead, once a woman becomes pregnant she is 
governed in her reactions and conduct by the rules of the institution. Her own 
feelings and decisions are irrelevant, she is presumed to comply with the 
model.55 
'Mother' and 'child' evoke an image of caring and need for protection, 
respectively; only a mother who is evil would kill her child, and she is 
unworthy of empathy. 
A 'mother' must be selfish and ignorant to desire abortion because that is not 
what 'mothers' do. It is legitimate to refuse to value the judgment of a 
'mother' whose judgment contravenes the image because the image is normal 
and good. Not only, as the 'drowning stranger' argument shows, is the image 
not good nor the way women can experience motherhood, but refusing to value 
the decision of a 'mother' also means a fundamental lack of respect for 
women's judgment. Unpacking "motherhood" reveals expectations found 
nowhere else and shows that by squashing women into roles as mothers, 
women are denied the status of independent and moral decision-makers as 
women, as people. 
Women make significant decisions in their lives. Pregnancy is one of the most 
determinative factors of women's lives and it should therefore be subject to 
their decision-making.56 
55 Above n 52, 1621. 
56 Above n 2, 94. 
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Why should women not make life or death decisions? 
The answer is that women should be recognised as being able to make such 
decisions. It is only by casting women as 'mothers' who must conform to the 
dictates of the institution and therefore whose decisions have no status within 
that framework, that women's capacity for judgment is able to be ignored. 
Unpacking the institution is important because it is on that basis that women 
are denied the status of decision-making people. Therefore by showing that 
the image is not a 'true' one - that it does not conform to actual experience 
- and that behind its facade we are forcing women to subordinate themselves 
for others in ways our law does not find justified in any other circumstances, 
the way is open for valuing women and their judgments. 
C Guilt And Rape - Let The Punishment Fit The Crime 
Another assumption implicit in our law which must be deconstructed before 
the law could legitimate abortion is that pregnant women are somehow guilty. 
Part of this is that a woman who wishes to have an abortion contravenes the 
motherhood image and is therefore "evil". Even if she perceives pregnancy is 
harmful, she may justifiably be forced to suffer that harm, because of her guilt. 
There is a further image which a pregnant women violates and for which, our 
law implies, she should suffer the consequences. Section 187 A(l )( c) of the 
Crimes Act expressly provides that one of the considerations of the medical 
determination of an abortion's lawfulness is where the pregnancy is the result 
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of sexual violation.57 Case law expresses the same sentiments. Woodhouse J 
in R v Woolnough58 mentioned that "a condition of forced pregnancy, the 
result of rape"59 might be a special circumstance as regards the "lawful 
limits"60 of abortion. If the law expressly provides that women who were 
raped need not be forced to continue their pregnancies, then it also implies 
that women who voluntary had sex ought to be forced to continue their 
pregnancies, no matter what harm they might suffer. 
The image assumed by the law is that "women" ought to abstain from sex. The 
focus of the law is not on whether the pregnancy was voluntary or unwanted, 
but on the voluntariness of the sexual conduct. A woman who voluntarily had 
sex but involuntarily became pregnant violates the image and should suffer the 
consequences. A rape victim, whose pregnancy is similarly involuntary, did not 
violate the image and does not therefore assume the label of guilt. Violating 
the law's images and acquiring a label of guilt has serious flow-on effects for 
women's whole status in abortion. These are made clear in a question from a 
judge during the course of argument of the landmark US case Roe v Wade61 • 
During discussion of which life (the woman's or the foetus') the state should 
protect, he asked: 62 
Well, which would you choose? Would you choose to kill the innocent one 
or what? 
57 Rape was not made an express ground for an abortion because of the difficulties of proof 
and coordination of this section with the requirements of a criminal conviction for sexual 
violation. Royal Commission of Inquiry Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion in New 
Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 1977), 212-214. 
58 R v Woolnough [1977) 2 NZLR 508. 
59 Above n 58, 521. 
60 Above n 58, 521. 
61 410 us 113 (1973). 
62 Quoted in above n 52, 1628. 
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Because women's argument for abortion is so seriously undermined by the 
images which attach blame to them, we should deconstruct the contradictions 
of the images. If women are guilty because they "got pregnant" then the 
assumption is that women should abstain from sex ( as the rape consideration 
implies), or generally should use contraception. The image that women abstain 
from sex ignores63 
the context of how women get pregnant, that is, as a consequence of 
intercourse under conditions of gender inequality. 
Abstaining from sex requires that women control sex when feminism shows that 
not women, but men control sex in our society. 64 
Following from this, the alternative justification for blame - that the woman 
ought to have used contraception - shows itself as equally unreasonable. Use 
of contraception means planning the possibility of intercourse - yet women 
are not supposed to initiate sex. Not only do men tend to control sexual 
intercourse but more: 65 
women feel compelled to preserve the appearance - which, acted upon, 
becomes the reality - of male direction of sexual expression. 
The effect of these contradictory images is that women are blamed for having 
sex, or not controlling it and so violating that image, when the only way to 
avoid doing so is to violate the image that women should not control 
intercourse. 
63 Above n 2, 96. 
64 Above n 2, 94. 
65 Above n 2, %. 
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All these images, from what "motherhood" entails to the guilt of being 
pregnant, structure the abortion debate in such a way that women's arguments 
must be devalued. These images need to be eradicated in order that the 
debate can be restructured and looked at from a woman's point of view. The 
way the de .., ate is framed can have considerable consequences for its outcome. 
For example:66 
[One] means to reduce abortion would be for the state to outlaw the act 
of impregnating women who do not wish to become pregnant. 
IV DECISION-PROCESSES 
A Rights And Conflict 
Both the legislation67 and the reasoning of the court judgments interpreting 
abortion law frame the abortion issue in terms of conflicting rights. For 
feminism, rights are an inadequate process to deal with abortion. The current 
rights categories do not protect women's values in the way they do men's. 
Even further though, rights are an inappropriate moral framework because 
they are based in the liberal vision of the human being - which is foreign to 
women and especially wrong for the situation during pregnancy. 
In content, rights68 
66 Above n 16, 640; quoting F Olsen "Unravelling Compromise" (1989) 103 Harv L Rev 
105, 730. 
67 Eg. the conflict in the Crimes Act 1%1 between ss 182, 182A and 187A; and in the long 
title of the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977. 
68 Above n 12, 633. 
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remain restricted to those that a predominantly white upper middle class 
male judiciary has been prepared to regard as fundamental. 
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Rights particularly tend to privilege what a liberal human being would value 
and protect from what would harm him. Nowhere is there a right to 
individuation, or even more basically protection of a minimum quality of life 
standard, which women could invoke for themselves. Because in law state 
interference is delineated by rights, when the content of rights is without weight 
for women, it is very hard to show the limits or valid types of intervention. 
The available rights categories in which women are forced to frame their issues 
immediately disadvantage their claims. Between a right to social convenience 
or privacy and a right to life there are inherent weightings. This is made most 
clear in the often made assumption69 that if the foetus is a person then no 
woman could have a claim to abortion. The only reason that this could be so 
is if the foetus' rights must necessarily override the woman's - so that the 
normal balancing tests involved in rights assessments would be redundant. 
Women's claims are currently confined to 'rights' which have a much lower 
priority than any rights a foetus might have. 
There are further ways that the debate is intrinsically structured to devalue the 
arguments of women. For example, in R v Woolnough10 the issue was framed 
as:71 
69 Eg. in the landmark Roe v Wade case 410 US 113 (1973), 156-157: "If (the] suggestion of 
personhood is established the appellant's case, of course, collapses". 
70 Above n 58. 
71 Above n 58, 517. 
JULIA CATTANACH 
What is a justification ... for a departure from the purpose of the section 
in protecting a potential life. 
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In effect, in formulating the right this way the reason for restricting the right is 
incorporated into the very definition of the right itself. The right incorporates 
some right of the woman to kill the "potential life", which means "the 
fundamental nature of that liberty inevitably vanishes".72 
The rights framework also has inherent consequences for women in that it 
helps to preserve some of the images which restrict recognition of their harm. 
The ability of the law to focus on foetal rights and even to prefer them implies 
the particular vision of women which they are trying to deconstruct. Foetal 
rights implies that subordinating women to the pregnancy is justified. Framing 
the issue of abortion in this way can often exclude women entirely from the 
debate. Women are irrelevant to this conception of morality, for example: 73 
the fundamental ethical issue in abortion - at what point, and in what 
circumstances, does a fetus become a person - and at what point does 
that person have rights to an existence. 
In fact, rights are inappropriate not just in their current definitions and use but 
as a method of moral decision-making at all. Rights assume the autonomy of 
the bearer of them and isolate him/her as an individual. This assumption is not 
only not true of fundamentally connected women, but it is glaringly untrue in 
pregnancy. 
72 Above n 54, 185. 
73 J K Mason and R A McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics (2 ed) (Butterworths and Co 
Ltd, London, 1987), 75. 
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[W]ithin the material/feta! relationship, even the minimal degree of bodily 
autonomy requisite for a fetal rights claim is lacking.74 
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Not only does a rights framework impose individual autonomy on the parties, it 
also sets them up in opposition to each other. A conflict approach to decision 
making is the typical liberal response, yet75 
[t]bere appears to be no justification, biological or logical, for the 
construction of a debate that places mother and fetus in an oppositional 
relationship when they are very clearly linked. 
Although conflict may be the standard framework for liberal decision making, 
it can do nothing constructive when it tries to divide and pit against each other 
two elements of something so mutually interconnected as pregnancy. "Conflict 
talk"76 is based on the liberal assumption that competition between individuals 
is the normal situation for achieving goals. Liberalism's conflict approach, 
then, fails77 
to recognize that many meaningful and important interactions are 
motivated by particular concerns, commitments, and loyalties and are 
based on ideals of co-operation, trust, and interdependence. 
The resolution of issues where the relationships involved clearly involve 
cooperation and connection rather than conflict, should reflect those values 
74 Above n 53, 86. 
75 Above n 53, 86. 
76 Above n 1, 902. 
77 K Jackson "And Justice For All? Human Nature and the Feminist Critique of Liberalism" 
in J O'Barr (ed) Women and New Academy (University of Wisconsin Press, USA, 1989), 
122, 127. 
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too. Legal dispute resolution, following the conflict model generally requires 
win/lose situations because: 78 
something must either be one way, or another. It cannot be a complicated 
mix of factors and still be legally digestible. 
This fact that79 
rights discourse cannot resolve social conflict but can only restate it in 
somewhat abstract, conclusory form 
is the basis of feminist critique of rights decision processes. Rights simplify 
complex relationships by abstracting - complexities which give content to 
women's morality and can lead to value judgments and solutions. Rights base 
themselves on formal equality and "fairness" where morality for women is 
rooted in equity and "the recognition of differences in need". 80 
When the focus is on rights, it is just as possible to claim feta! rights as it 
is to claim maternal rights. Toe debate appears to be a ping-pong match 
with both sides claiming the primacy of rights on their side. This ping-
pong match is founded on a maternal/feta! conflict. As the characteristics 
of personhood are increasingly attributed to the fetus, so the 
characteristics of personhood belonging to the mother are correspondingly 
devalued.81 
78 Above n 1, 902. 
79 Above n 12, 633. 
80 Above n 43, 164. 
81 Above n 53, 85. 
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The artificial construction of conflict and abstract rights cover the fact that the 
resolution of a rights conflict is not inherent in the rights at all. The framing of 
the rights and the weighting of them are dictated by background assumptions 
which are not apparent on the face of the debate. For women the appropriate 
decision framework is that:82 
right[s] ... are weighed not in the abstract, in terms of their logical priority, 
but in the particular, in terms of the actual consequences that the violation 
of these rights will have in the lives of the people involved. 
B Abstraction 
That the use of rights leads to abstraction is one of feminism's main concerns 
with rights theory because abstraction is so fundamentally foreign to women's 
conception of morality. Male morals are designed to transcend life - to put 
humanity on a plane higher than nature.83 Women feel more tied to nature 
through pregnancy and so their morality is more tied to life. 
Abstraction as part of the decision-making process has significant consequences 
for women and their arguments. Liberal legalism's insistence on abstract 
process - especially through the use of rights - is an "insistence on ... formal 
equality [which] serves to perpetuate social inequality".84 Formal equality 
hides the power relationships and people's characteristics which probably 
underlie the dispute. Not only are the outcomes of the decision process going 
to be prejudiced by failing to take account of the context of the decision, but 
possible solutions are also restricted. Abstracting the issue means denying the 
82 Above n 43, 95. 
83 Above n 11, 24. 
84 M Stubbs "Feminism and Legal Positivism" (1986) Aust Jn! of L & Soc 63, 70. 
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decision process access to the on-going relationships of the parties and cuts-off 
possible resolution based on the reasons behind each party's stance on the 
issue. Such a resolution may be better than an abstract, conflict-based, 
win/lose "solution". 
Abstraction, for women means considering an issue in a way which makes 
them85 
atomistic actors removed from the affiliations that give meaning to their 
lives and content to their choices. 
Because the relationships and connections of women are so much a part of 
themselves, abstraction means denying parts of their identities. As a method of 
moral decision making, abstract thinking is both irrelevant and damaging to 
women. 
Yet our abortion law very much reflects abstract thinking - even apart from 
its framing of the debate in terms of decontextual rights. In particular, 
protection of the foetus and its interests is often considered in abstract from 
the circumstances of the potential harm. The granting of rights to action for 
injury caused prior to birth, for example the Thalidomide cases, is often seen 
as extending to give the foetus ' interests more weight.86 
In R v Henderson 87, it was clear that the abstract way crimes are constructed 
in our law severely complicates things. Because ss 182-187A of the Crimes Act 
abstract the foetus on what is done to it, unlike situations, with totally different 
85 Above n 12, 629. 
86 Above n 49, 227. 
87 R v Henderson [1990] 3 NZLR 174. 
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moral contexts, are forced to be treated alike. The court had to find that 
sections of the law overlapped to a large extent because abstraction meant the 
law does not distinguish between a woman needing an abortion and a third 
party, in that case the father of the child, punching and kicking a woman and 
intending to kill her unborn child. The judgment considered the rules relating 
to legitimate abortion to be relevant because the foetus and its condition were 
abstracted from any contextual differences. Because of the use of abstract 
moral reasoning, protection of the foetus against third parties which enhances a 
woman's own protection of her pregnancy can also potentially impact on her 
own ability to protect herself from invasion. Abstraction means that such 
protection from third parties is extended to also apply to the woman - who is 
not a third party. Although when women's harms are recognised, the situations 
are patently different, abstraction forces an artificial construction on the issue. 
In fact, it is abstract reasoning which enables the law to focus on the foetus at 
all. The law abstracts the individuality, because liberal theory values and 
understands it, and ignores the connectedness of the foetus altogether. State 
control of women to protect this "individual" is only justified through an 
abstract moral process. 
C Objectivity 
Abstraction is also used as a tool to maintain the illusion of objectivity about 
abortion decisions. Objectivity as a decision-process is questionable not only as 
to its value as a process at all, but also because many decisions masquerading 
as objective are really biased or subjective. "The objectification of law 
successfully disguises the fact that it is the product of fallible human beings"88 
88 M Thornton "Feminist Jurisprudence: Illusion or Reality?" (1986) 3 Aust Jnl of L & Soc 
5, 7. 
JULIA CATTANACH Page 40 
so it is therefore necessary to maintain the facade of objectivity. If the 
objective mask is dropped it becomes clear that what women have argued is 
true: that it is impossible to separate a decision-maker's personal or moral 
background from the content of his or her decisions. Revealing the bias 
behind objectivity is crucial for women because to make decisions assume the 
appearance of moral neutrality, means it is very difficult for women to argue 
that their experiences are excluded from consideration. 
There are several situations in New Zealand abortion law which must be shown 
not to be objective as claimed in order that women's arguments can be heard. 
First, we must deconstruct the courts' claim to be objective and not to be 
making politically-charged decisions. In Woolnough, 89 where the Court was 
deciding under what circumstances abortion was unlawful, Richmond P noted 
that:9() 
the function impliedly entrusted to the courts ... is not to say who is right 
and who is wrong as between the extreme views held by different sections 
of the community as regards their highly controversial subject. Rather the 
courts have to do their best to draw a line at a point where the procuring 
of a miscarriage ceases to be merely a matter of debate, from a religious, 
moral or ethical point of view, and becomes activity of a kind which 
warrants its designation as criminal. 
How can a court not be making a moral decision when saying when a woman 
can and cannot have an abortion? By saying that it is drawing a line where 
there is no debate, the court is covering the fact that it is involved in part of 
89 Above n 58. 
90 Above n 58, 517-518. 
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the structure that maintains images, by drawing such lines which do exclude 
women's own arguments and experience of pregnancy. 
Similarly in Wall v Livingston91, the Court tried to maintain the objective 
nature of the law in a way which precludes any argument by women that it 
does not reflect their own values. Section 30(5) of the Contraception, 
Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977 tries to exclude as decision-makers medical 
practitioners whose views might colour their decisions - especially those 
believing no abortion is justified, or that it is a private doctor-patient decision. 
The Court thought that the provision was: 92 
to ensure ... determinations [made) in a clinically detached way ... It is a 
provision designed to avoid determinations that may be influenced by bias 
or predetermination based on some strong subjective attitude in one 
direction or the other concerning the sensitive question of abortion. 
In fact, the provision does not ensure the objective decision the judges thought 
it did. Rather, it requires that the decisions be biased by a specific type of 
"predetermin[ed] ... subjective attitude", that is that the 'rights' of the 'unborn 
child' can be inhibited only by serious health risks for the mother. 
Section 187 A of the Crimes Act distinguishes between pregnancies of more or 
less than 20 weeks gestation. This is an attempt, following English cases, to 
introduce some so-called objective standard of "viability of the foetus" as 
justification for restricting abortions even further after that date. Viability is a 
particularly dangerous standard because not only does it claim to be neutral, 
but it also brings with it the authority of being 'scientific'. Although in New 
91 Wall v Livingston [1982] 1 NZLR 734. 
92 Above n 91, 738. 
JULIA CATTANACH Page 42 
Zealand the standard is set at the moment at 20 weeks any alteration of the 
viability standard is a political not an objective decision because it impacts on 
the degree of control a woman has over her pregnancy. However, the whole 
idea of incorporating viability as a relevant standard is suspect. 
Whether or not the foetus is viable depends not only on the foetus, but on its 
environment, and the efforts of the medical team. 93 A moral test which 
supposedly legitimately restricts women because it is objective cannot be 
contingent on the moral decisions of others at the time. Further, technology 
itself is not a neutral standard-setter.94 
When we talk of technology, we are not only talking about a product or 
process ... but also about a whole set of ideas or values that go into the 
design, making and use of such a process. 
Technology, therefore is not morally independent - we make decisions as to 
what to develop or use based on a whole set of moral assumptions, which must 
lie behind any test based on technology. Retaining technology as part of our 
moral standard also retains the medical profession as the deciders of that 
standard. This is a result of the assumption that technology is more the 
concern of those who understand it, even when it raises ethical issues. Others 
are marginalised in their input by their lack of knowledge of the technology 
involved in the ethical issue. 
The incorporation of a 20 week viability distinction is even less maintainable 
when what it implies is unpacked. A woman has less opportunity to have an 
93 Above n 73, 78. 
94 Above n 49, 219. 
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abortion if the foetus is outside the "objective" 20 week standard. This means 
that: 95 
[b ]ecause medical science could preserve the fetus' life outside the womb, 
[the law] impose[s] on the pregnant woman the responsibility to preserve 
the foetus' life inside her womb ... A woman has the capability of bringing 
a fetus to term from the moment of conception; it does not make sense 
for her moral responsibility to increase because an outside agent acquires 
that capability but prefers not to exercise it. 
Therefore, it should be openly recognised that restrictions like the distinction 
imposed in section 187 A are political and not objective or neutral decisions. 
They are then open to criticism by women. It is time to drop the neutral 
facade - to96 "give up ... objectivity and try for ... fairness". Decisions can 
then be made as to whose subjectivity is most appropriate for protecting the 
values and harms of any issue. 
D Women's Different Decision Process 
Women make moral decisions in a different framework from the abstract, 
conflict-orientated, rights-based technique liberal legal theory uses. Women's 
connection and recognition of their interdependence with others informs their 
decision-making process. The process involves empathy, responsibility and 
conciliation instead of rights and combative resolutions.
97 Women form moral 
95 Above n 39, 1056. 
96 Above n 2, 9. 
97 Above n 12, 631-632. 
JULIA CATTANACH Page 44 
decisions in reference to others - including their own actions, so it is 
impossible98 to equate all expressed preferences with self-defined interests. 
Women use this different moral framework in the abortion context. As 
D Greschner put it:99 
I have yet to read any description of a woman facing an unwanted 
pregnancy who used the cold calculus of competing rights as her method 
of decision-making. 
Instead of an abstract prioritising of rights, women reconstruct the dilemma in 
a way that100 
focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension 
between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the 
interconnection of other and self ... the fact of interconnection informs the 
central, recurring recognition that ... the activity of care enhances both 
others and self. 
Women's recognition of their connection with others means they do not try to 
solve the concerns of one but resolve the dilemma in a way that means 
responsibility and care for everyone, including themselves. 
Part of the restructuring of the dilemma involves contextualising - recognising 
the practical impact on those around her of the actual consequences of her 
98 Above n 13, 933. 
99 Above n 16, 653. 
100 Above n 43, 74. 
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decision. This causes confusion when the liberal, abstract form of morality has 
been presented as objective and whole. Women say things like: 
I am saying that abortion is morally wrong but the situation is right. 1
01 
You really don't know your black and whites until you really get into them 
and face being confronted with it. 102 
Catherine Gilligan observed that women question why abstract morality did not 
fit with their own conception of morality and more, why liberal morality did not 
recognise their harms: 103 
she questions not only the justification for hurting others in the name of 
morality but also the 'rightness' of hurting herself. 
Contextualising means that for women, an abortion decision is inherently 
violent whichever decision is made. Under a legal-liberal analysis, deciding in 
favour of whichever right is prior is the just solution. For women, all solutions 
hurt - compromise the ethic of care and therefore no solution can be truly 
just. 
Since women not only have different experiences of value and harm but also 
different moral decision-processes, it seems appropriate that those decisions 
which affect women most and are experiences which men do not have at least, 
should be subject to women's decision-process. Decisions on abortion should 
be made within the complete moral framework of women. 
101 Above n 43, 86. 
102 Above n 43, 87. 
103 Above n 43, 87. 
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V DECISION MAKING INTERESTS 
A The Unique Advantages Of Women 
Women's moral decision-making process of empathy and context means 
women are particularly appropriate to control decisions as to their reproductive 
capacity. What makes women uni,quely appropriate is their physically and 
emotionally connected position in relation to the foetus. Once the restricting 
images are deconstructed, there is no reason not to respect women's moral 
judgment. The law's implied and unjustified assumptions were the only real 
thing preventing abortion decisions being placed in the hands of the women 
who are in the best position to make them. 
There is no reason to fear that women will make abortion decisions frivolously. 
It is only because the law does not yet recognise women's moral framework 
that such a concern could be raised. A woman's abortion decision is a decision 
between protecting herself from one of her greatest harms - foetal invasion, 
and promoting one of her greatest values - the nurturance and care of a 
vulnerable life. Such a choice cannot be taken lightly. That women often do 
use their creative and nurturing powers to have babies despite the threat it can 
pose to their self-identity shows there is little need for the liberal concern with 
aggressive reaction. 104 Abortion decisions should be recognised as having a 
place alongside all the other moral decisions women are trusted to make. 
Even more, pregnancy can have such a significant effect on women's lives that 
so fundamental a life decision should be left to the women affected by it most. 
104 See above n 42 and accompanying text. 
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[T]he notion that women's 'connectedness' in motherhood contributes to a 
distinct moral vision reinforces the appropriateness of women's decision 
making during pregnancy.105 
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If the ultimate relationship of pregnancy creates a distinct moral outlook then 
that outlook ought at least to be applied to the relationship it derives from. 
Interconnection should justify women's control of pregnancy because it creates 
a unique perspective and understanding of the relationship.106 
[T]he law should privilege, not penalize, the pregnant woman based on her 
physical and psychological connection with the developing foetus. 
Connection should not be the justification, as it is now, for state intervention 
based on liberal ideas of power relationships. Also, the liberal preference for 
abstract reasoning should not be used to devalue women's potential for 
contribution. Although abstraction means that anyone can consider the 'rights' 
and decide their priority, context means that women must hold a unique ability 
to consider the pregnancy relationship. Since there is no real objective 
decision making possible, women's direct involvement gives them a valuable 
perspective which is important to deciding whose subjective decision making is 
best. 
Women have the advantage of being able to tell when a pregnancy is the 
harmful invasion they need to be protected against. Since the test is a 
subjective feeling of threat to identity, women's feelings must be decisive. 
105 Above n 42, 1340. 
106 Above n 42, 1340. 
., 
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There is a truth about feelings. One can be right or wrong about them. 
Thus while they are subjective in the sense that only the person having the 
feeling can be 'authoritative' on whether she feels something, her true 
feelings are not simply whatever impression, or experience, or sensation 
she has at the moment ... there is in the end a right answer as to what she 
really feels. 107 
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That "right answer" which largely will be determinative of what decision should 
be reached regarding abortion can be provided only by the woman involved. If 
the capacity for individuation "can develop only in the context of relations with 
others ... that nurture this capacity11108 then women have the unique position 
to identify which relationships, and in particular whether the relationship with 
the foetus will promote or prevent individuation. Women, being the authority 
on the harm, should decide when protection from it is needed. 
Liberal legal theory assumes that the content of individual preferences is 
irrelevant for organising social structures. Here, the content of women's 
preferences, for example that they extend through the ethic of care to the 
preferences of those around them, is particularly relevant to the abortion 
process and even makes women especially appropriate deciders. There is a 
potential problem that a claim for reproductive control based on women's role 
as caretakers will reinforce existing social restrictions. 109 But the claim is 
more than that. The claim is that women have a role as moral decision makers 
because their moral framework of interdependence and responsibility is at least 
as legitimate as a liberal framework of conflict and independence and may, in 
many circumstances be a more relevant approach. In the abortion situation 
107 Above n 35, 23. 
108 Above n 35, 11. 
109 Above n 42, 1339. 
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women should be presumed to be the best decision makers both because any 
other moral framework is less appropriate and because women are inherently 
involved in the issue. 
B The Voice Of The Foetus 
Should the impact on the interests of the foetus be represented in the making 
of the abortion decision? The hidden implications of such a claim need to be 
unpacked. First, though a critique of the foetal personhood and rights 
arguments needs to be made. 
The background to the critique of the foetal rights argument is that the claim 
for personhood in the foetus emerged only after restriction of abortion could 
no longer be justified by reference to the proper role of women as mothers. 
Foetal rights became the new instrument for control of women.110 The 
argument for foetal personhood in this context runs: 111 
either the foetus is seen as a person with full moral status or it is a thing 
like a chair or a table. Since it is not a chair, it must be a person. 
Personhood is seen as something absolute and objectively defined and 
therefore it is justified to devalue women's own personhood on those grounds. 
In fact personhood is a political and moral decision, it is not something 
inherent. Therefore 11rights11 should be given in context. Women should be 
protected from the strong harms they suffer by conscious decision. Foetal 
interests can be given value in the light of this. If the interests are something 
110 Above n 16, 662. 
111 Above n 16,651. 
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we are giving to an entity which is neither a 'person' of full moral status, nor a 
thing, we can decide the content of them and make our concern for others, 
especially women, the context for the allocation of those interests. Even the 
'rights' of an entity with full personhood bend to those of other persons. 
In fact the whole discussion of the personhood of the foetus begs the question 
of why the foetus and not the woman should be the state's legitimate concern. 
Even full personhood in foetuses112 
does not prevent the state from infringing their liberties because of its 
strong interest in protecting the liberties of another group of persons. 
Once the law recognises the moral significance of the harm women suffer 
which is not redressed by current legal theory, and once the unjustified 
assumptions behind that failure are deconstructed there is no reason why 
women should not be the starting point for any discussion. The law should 
prefer adult, full person women. The presumption should be that the law's 
role is to protect en from the strongest of harm. 
Once the strength of women's claim on the law for protection is recognised, 
any displacement of the presumption should be fully acknowledged as a 
decision not to value women. 
To talk about autonomy of the foetus , which is necessary to give the foetus 
rights, is nonsensical speech because foetal autonomy can exist only as 
part of a woman's freedom. 113 
112 Above n 39, 1057. 
113 Above n 16, 652. 
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The law must realise that prioritising protection from harm is a political and 
moral decision and should not be done through biased images and incomplete 
theory. One abortion law is free from the restraints of liberal legal theory, full-
personhood, grievously-harmed women can openly be favoured. 
The claim that the foetus has interests which ought to be given a voice in the 
decision-process is based on liberal ideas ignoring the fundamental connection 
of pregnancy. 
Even to say that a foetus is independent with its own voice [to be heard] is 
to accept one traditional, religious, medical viewpoint of women. 
Moreover, the very best person to speak for the foetus is its mother, for 
the two are inseparable ... speaking for the foetus of/within a woman is to 
speak for the woman ... It is not the case that foetuses do not have a 
voice; it is simply that their voices - mother's voices - are ones that 
patriarchy does not want to hear. 114 
Who can better represent the foetus than the one who is intimately, 
psychologically and physically connected with it. Their relationship is one of a 
complex web of interconnected needs and empathy and in most senses of the 
word women and the foetuses can not have independent interests. Women's 
connection with the foetus gives them the authority and responsibility to speak. 
C A Medical Decision 
Currently the medical profession is seen to have the dominant decision-making 
interest. The legislative scheme of the Contraception, Sterilisation and 
Abortion Act revolves around a medical determination of when abortion is 
114 Above n 16, 654. 
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needed or justified. In Wall v Livingstone on at least eight separate 
occasions115, the decision whether a woman should be able to abort is 
described and approved of as entirely a medical judgment. It is ironic that if 
the decision is so based on medical considerations the emphasis in the Act 
should be on obstetricians and gynaecologists116 when the majority of 
abortions are based on mental health grounds. This raises the question of 
whether the decision really is a "medical assessment pure and simple"117 at 
all. 
The courts have impliedly acknowledged that there are factors other than 
medical ones even in the determination within the Contraception, Sterilisation 
and Abortion Act framework. The Court in Wall v Livingstone cited and 
approvec. mment that "a great social responsibility is firmly placed by the 
law on the shoulders of the medical profession". 118 
The Court also implied there were more than medical interests in a doctor's 
decision in its discussion of the Act's treatment of the rights of the 'unborn 
child'. Nowhere in the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act is there 
express protection for the rights of the 'unborn child', despite it being 
mentioned in the long title as one of the Act's aims. The Court said that, 
instead "[t]he matter is handled indirectly". 119 The moral debate as to the 
weight given to120 
115 Above n 91: twice p 736, p 737, p 738, twice p 739, twice p 741. 
116 Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act ss 30(4)(a) and 32. 
117 Above n 91, 739. 
118 Above n 91, 739 quoting Lord Scarman in R v Smith (1973] 1 WLR 1510, 1512. 
119 Above n 91, 737 approving the lower court description of the legislation's effect. 
120 Above n 91, 737 (my emphasis). 
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the rights of the unborn child would be given the attention intended by 
Parliament simply by being at the forefront of the medical determination 
arranged to take place in terms of the statute. 
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If abortion is admitted as not really a medical judgment, what is the interest of 
the medical profession in the decision at all? 
"The concept of autonomy certainly pervades the whole of medical 
practice".121 Even the decision-processes are based in liberal modes because 
of the scientific research background of medicine. How then can the medical 
profession decide when women should have abortions? An autonomy ethic 
does not comprehend a longing for individuation, let alone recognise invasion 
as a harm to protect against. Liberal decision-making is unrelated to the moral 
framework necessary to deal with a fundamentally connected relationship. 
Therefore, even the wide definition of "health" given to the grounds for 
abortion does not change the fact that a male-ethic dominated profession will 
define it. 
It seems to have been taken as sufficient justification that because the medical 
profession controls the means to the end, it should control access to the end 
itself. This assumption is unsafe because its implications are the vulnerability 
of women to grievous harm, which they cannot protect themselves against. 
The main source of this vulnerability is a variation on the public/private 
dichotomy which is so much a focus of feminist criticism. 
The public face of abortion is in the legislative framework which appears very 
strict on its face. This reflects a common state practice to take a "high" moral 
121 Above n 73, 7. 
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stance regarding the "sanctity of life" and yet modify the harsh effects by 
allowing a somewhat more flexible interpretation in practice. This is the case 
with abortion in New Zealand where the private/practice stance is less rigid 
than the public.122 This appears to be some solution, but is 
unacceptable.123 
The liberal idea of the private - and privacy as an ideal has been 
formulated in liberal terms - holds that, so long as the public does not 
interfere, autonomous individuals interact freely and equally. 
Women are immensely vulnerable to privately wielded power. They are 
hostag .. nt: revailing attitudes of the certifying doctors in their area at the 
time. They are also vulnerable to any change restricting the private practice 
because they cannot claim public protection. The law has made a public 
stance and inherently refuses to intervene in the private in the hope of 
protecting autonomy. There is no opening for a claim that women have no 
power in the private. 
Within the current framework, there appears no reason why medical decision-
making interests should be most important.124 In fact, they can be harmful. 
Certainly if the law recognises the real framework of harm women suffer in 
pregnancy there is no reason why the medical profession should be able to veto 
or approve of a woman's need of protection. 
122 Julie Crosland (above n 22) indicated this was the case and that it is widely seen as a 
satisfactory solution to the state's dilemma. 
123 Above n 2, 99. 
124 Above n 22. Julie Crosland commented that the common attitude is that it is treating 
women like children to require them to get permission from someone in order that they 
might abort. 
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D The 'Father' Of The Child 
The traditional liberal response to the feminist argument for recognition of 
women's empathy and connection is "empathy for everyone".125 That is, that 
the connection of the father means he has an equal interest in the abortion 
decision. This illustrates once again liberal legal theory's preference for 
abstract formal equality - which it tries to impose on unequal parties through 
a liberty balancing regime.126 
The outcome depends on what factors are selected for emphasis and who 
is evaluating the relative strengths of the respective liberties. For example, 
if the decision maker is morally opposed to abortion, the father's interest 
in preventing an immoral act will be seen to outweigh any interest the 
woman has in doing that act. But if the evaluator thinks that a woman's 
right to control her reproductive capacity is vitally important to her self-
realization, and that a man's biological role in producing a child is of Jess 
duration and physical consequence than a woman's role, then the woman's 
liberty interest will clearly "win". There is no neutral, objective way to 
calibrate and compare the relative weights of two liberty interests, nor is 
the result of any balancing effort outcome neutral. Sometimes, a 
balancing test can simply be an invitation for the perspective and 
preferences of the traditionally powerful to triumph once again. 
Balancing the respective rights of mothers and fathers implies an equality that 
is not true in substance. Mothers and fathers are not in equal positions 
regarding the foetus, let along the pregnancy: 127 
125 Above n 16, 657. 
126 Above n 13, 931. 
127 Above n 16, 664. 
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a man's contribution of sperm in the act of conception does not make him 
a father in the same way as the woman becomes a mother with her 
physical labour and nurturance of the fertilised egg from the moment of 
conception. 
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It is only by abstracting some autonomy interest that men and women can be 
treated the same. Why should contributing sperm make the foetus more the 
father's than the mother's who continues to expend physical and emotional 
effort in a continuing connection relationship?128 The 'father' is more a 
"potential father". 129 
It should be recognised that imposing formal equality is not an outcome-neutral 
technique. Preferring the interests of women may restrict fathers in some way 
but it is more justified by the unique values and connection of the mother. It 
should be accepted that prioritising interests is a political decision whichever 
way it is done and it should be done on openly justified grounds, and not 
covertly. 
Such a decision to prefer the decision making interests of the mother does not 
exclude the father's interests entirely. The father of the child is usually a large 
part of any woman's decision to have an abortion and often plays a direct 
role. 130 Even when he does not play a direct role women's decision processes 
are such that his views are a big part of a woman's formulation of the morality 
of her act. Responsibility and the ethic of care extend to mean that women's 
128 Compare the Status of Children Amendment Act 1987 which distinguishes between the 
donation of gametes which gives no parental rights and the automatic motherhood of the 
woman who is pregnant 
129 Above n 16, 664. 
130 Above n 22. The father of the child often attends the counselling sessions and is 
incorporated into the process. 
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views of the morality of their actions depends on how it will hurt others. They 
form their own preferences in relation to those important to them. 
E A Group Decision 
Similar considerations apply for the claim that all those connected with the 
decision, such as the wider family, have interests in the decision. The first, 
most basic problem is that in a group decision, private inequalities and power 
structures are reinforced by lack of intervention. Women who have the 
dominant interest, are usually the ones who are the vulnerable party in power 
hierarchies. 
More fundamentally though, the idea of a group decision being necessary is 
sourced in the liberal construct of separate individuals pursuing their own self-
interest. Women see responsibility as applying to everyone and extend the 
ethic of care to all their relationships. Legal theory does not recognise this 
because it constructs responsibility only as part of a power relationship of the 
responsible to the vulnerable. Women's "web like imagery of relationships"131 
means preferences are a complex mix of the needs of those around her. 
Women's moral framework can pose a dilemma for her if, as often happens, 
the family are pressuring her to abort against her desire to nurture the 
foetus. 132 
Although the feminine identification of goodness with self-sacrifice clearly 
dictates the 'right' resolution of this dilemma, the stakes may be high for 
131 Above n 43, 173. 
132 Above n 43, 80. 
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the woman herself, and in any event the sacrifice of the foetus 
compromises the altruism of an abortion motivated by concern for others. 
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However, there is no need for the imposition of some adjudicating tribunal 
decision on the situation. That reflects liberalism's mistakes that decision 
making would collapse into self-interest and conflict without the intervention of 
"objective justice". 133 There are not warring individuals separate from one 
another - nor is objectivity possible or helpful. Women's subjectivity must be 
the best option. 
F Counselling And Process 
Since women hold the most powerful interest in abortion decision making it 
should be their conclusion which is authoritative. We can trust them as moral 
decision makers with the most appropriate framework and the greatest 
information and connection with the issue. However, such a decision will be 
hard for women given that their choice will be between greatest harms and 
values and they will perceive it as inherently violent. Women find the web of 
counselling support helpful in resolving their own feelings and morality. 134 
Therefore some counselling process for affirming women's decision processes 
will be helpful. Such a formal process will also mean that institutional health 
safety of abortion clinics can be regulated to women's benefit. 
The counselling should not be equivalent to some kind of permission or 
approval of a woman's judgment. 135 
133 Above n 77, 127. 
134 Above n 22. Women often express how good they feel to know they are not alone in the 
way they feel Counselling also provides the opportunity to resolve issues such as 
contraception, or even domestic violence. 
135 Above n 42, 1341. 
JULIA CATTANACH 
Absent clear evidence that the decision making process has failed, courts 
should not substitute their own judgment or that of a doctor for the 
woman's. 
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Disagreeing with a woman's decision should not be taken as "clear evidence" 
that the process has broken down. The safeguard should be for women's own 
protection to prevent undue outside interference. Any such process should 
recognise and value women, their harms and their moral framework. 
VI CONCLUSION 
New Zealand's abortion law is not currently relevant to women's lives and 
experience. The theory-base of law must be modified to reflect some kind of 
freedom for making a self-identity and that there is no autonomous self, for 
women, in isolation from their relationships. We need a contextual law, 
relevant to women's moral framework and giving proper recognition to the 
significance of their harms. 
The law should realise that there is no reason to displace women as the most 
appropriate decision makers. Women have the strongest interest in abortion 
decision both because of their connection and proximity and their unique moral 
judgment process. It is time for the law to revise its ''blind willingness to 
sacrifice people to truth"136 and to realise that the current framework of 
abortion law makes women hostage to their reproductive capacities - not only 
in their substantive lives but in their very identities. It is time that women 
stopped being hurt. 
136 Above n 43, 104. 
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